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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
MELINDA ROLLINS, personal : 
representative of the 
Estate of Marcel Schopf, : 
and ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Case No. 880280 
Plaintiffs/Appellants. Category No. 14b 
vs. 
JON MICHAEL PETERSEN and 
STATE OP UTAH, STATE HOSPITAL, : 
Defendants/Respondents. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
SUMMARY FOR ARGUMENT 
The specific allegations of negligence go beyond the 
allegation in the Complaint. Because this matter is before 
the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment, the 
Court must also consider plaintiff's allegations of negligent 
failure to follow established hospital policies and procedures. 
The negligent acts complained of do not involve 
discretionary acts. The actions of the hospital employees 
involved failure to follow established sign-out and AWOL 
procedures. The employee does not have discretion to ignore 
or amend the policies. As a result, the actions are not 
governed by the discretionary function exception to the 
immunity waiver. 
The State owed plaintiff a duty as a member of a class 
of motorists who could reasonably be injured by Petersen's 
actions. The state assumed this duty statutorily and had the 
duty imposed upon it by court order, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTS WHICH GIVE RISE TO THIS CAUSE OF ACTION ARE 
NOT DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF §63-30-10. 
The State of Utah argues that the alleged acts and 
omissions of hospital employees is protected by the 
discretionary function exception to the general waiver of 
immunity for negligence. The State cites plaintiff's 
complaint which alleges that the State negligently gave 
Petersen trustee status and argues that the decision involves 
a discretionary function. That allegation of negligence, 
however; is not the only allegation before the Court. This 
matter is before this Court on the trial court's order 
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff 
conducted discovery prior to the Court's ruling and alleged 
specific acts of negligence in addition to those stated in the 
complaint and were properly considered by the Court. The 
State now attempts to argue the allegations in the complaint 
while ignoring the specific allegation of negligence contained 
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in plaintiff's reply to defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. 
Plaintiff's additional allegations of negligence arise 
due to defendant's negligent failure to supervise and 
implement Jon Petersen's treatment program; negligent failure 
to comply with hospital release and sign out procedure; and 
negligent failure to discover and prevent Petersen's AWOL and 
failure to follow established AWOL procedures. (R.242) 
The specific acts complained of are not discretionary 
functions and instead relate to failure to implement existing 
policies and rules of the Hospital. The Supreme Court in Doe 
v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1986), defined discretionary 
function as it relates to decisions implementing policy. In 
Doe, the Court distinguished those actions of a State employee 
that are a discretionary function and deserving of protection 
from those actions that are not a discretionary function and 
undeserving of protection, as follows: 
Operational, routine, everyday matters not 
requiring evaluation of broad policy factors and 
which only implement established policy are 
nondiscretionary, ministerial functions. A 
decision or action implementing a preexisting 
policy is operation in nature and is undeserving 
of protection under the discretionary function 
exception. Little v. Utah State Division of 
Family Services, 667 P.2d at 52; Bigelow v. 
Ingersoll, Utah 618, P.2d 50 (1980); Frank v. 
State, Utah, 613 P.2d 517 (1980). Because a 
probation officer's policy decisions are 
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discretionary, he is immune from suit arising 
from those decisions. However, his acts 
implementing the policy must be considered on a 
case-by-case basis to determine whether they are 
ministerial and thereby outside the immunity 
protections. Semler v. Psychiatric institute of 
Washington, D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(citing Johnson v. State, 447 P.,2d at 362). 
(Emphasis added) . 
Plaintiff's theories of liability against the State of 
Utah sound in implementing preexisting policy, to-wit: 
1. Defendant's employees negligently failed to 
supervise Jon Petersen's activities on November 1, 
1986 when they failed to accompany him to return the 
lunch trays. 
2. Defendant's employees negligently failed to 
comply with ward and hospital rules requiring staff 
members to sign out all patients who leave the ward 
unaccompanied by staff including when the patient will 
return and what the patient was wearing. 
3. Defendant's employees failed to discover 
Petersen's absence for 2 1/2 hours after they knew or 
should have known that Petersen was to return. 
4. Defendant's employees failed to discovery 
Petersen's AWOL and implement procedures for finding 
and apprehending patient AWOLs. 
None of the above actions involve discretionary 
matters and instead involve implementing preexisting policies 
designed to prevent the kind of problems that actually 
occurred in this case. This conclusion is supported by an 
analysis of the purpose behind the discretionary function 
exception. 
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In Little v. Utah State Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 
(Utah 1983), the Court stated: 
[W]here the responsibility for basic policy 
decisions has been committed to one of the 
branches of our tripartite system of government, 
the Courts have refrained from sitting in 
judgment of the propriety of those decisions. 
TA. at 49. 
The converse of this position is that a state employer 
does not have discretion to violate previously established 
procedures. In this case, a psych tech did not have authority 
to allow Petersen to leave the ward without first signing out, 
describing when he would return, where he was going and what 
he was wearing. Furthermore, none of the staff had discretion 
as to AWOL procedures. (Fact 35) The staff were under an 
affirmative duty to monitor their patients and report 
discovery of an AWOL. (Facts 34, 35) Because these acts are 
ministerial, defendant cannot escape liability under 
discretionary function exception to §63-30-10. 
The interpretation of the discretionary function 
exception provided by Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 
1976), is inapplicable to the instant case. In Epting, the 
issue of failure to comply with established procedures as a 
negligent implementation of a discretionary function was not 
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pled. The majority in Epting did not decide the case on the 
basis of a planning-level versus operational-level analysis; 
however, this court has utilized that distinction in every 
case interpreting discretionary function since Epting. 
Thus, the acts complained do not fall within the 
discretionary function exception to the general statutory 
waiver of immunity for negligence. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT STATE OF UTAH'S PUBLIC DUTY ANALYSIS FAILS 
TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT THAT THE COURT ORDER IMPOSED A DUTY ON 
THE STATE TO SECURE PETERSEN UNTIL THE COURT ORDERED OTHERWISE. 
The State cites Obray v. Malberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 
P.2d 612 (1971) and Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 
1984) in support of its argument that it owed no duty to 
plaintiff to follow established policies and procedures in 
supervising Petersen's court ordered commitment to the State 
Hospital. The above cases are inapplicable to this cause of 
action because a court order imposed a duty upon the State 
committing Jon Petersen to the hospital because he was a 
dangerous mentally ill person. Petersen could therefore only 
be lawfully released after the court modified its previous 
order. See §77-15-6 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 
Under the court's order the State had imposed upon it 
a duty to control Petersen. This important distinction was 
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noted in Sterling v. Bloom, 723 P.2d 755, 768-770 (Idaho 
1986). Sterling involved a claim of negligent supervision of 
Bloom, an individual on probation by State* The probationer 
had pled guilty to a felony charge of operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
Bloom was sentenced to prison but the sentence was suspended 
and Bloom was placed on probation. Bloom was placed under 
legal custody and control of the Director of Probation and 
Parole. A special condition of probation was that for the 
first year of probation, Bloom was not to drive a motor 
vehicle except for employment purposes. 
Less than a year after entering into the agreement, 
Bloom operated a vehicle while intoxicated and was involved in 
a collision with plaintiff causing plaintiff's injury. 
Plaintiff filed an action against the State of Idaho and its 
probation department for acting negligently in its supervision 
of Bloom. Specifically, plaintiff alleged the following 
negligent acts: 
(1) allowing Bloom to drive a motor vehicle for 
nonemployment purposes, contrary to the order of 
probation; (2) allowing Bloom to operate a motor 
vehicle without the required written permission, 
contrary to the agreement of probation, (3) 
allowing Bloom to operate an uninsured motor 
vehicle in violation of I.e. §49-235, contrary 
to the agreement of probation, (4) allowing 
Bloom to reside in the same building which 
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housed the Seven Mile Lounge, and to work there 
as a bartender, (5) failing to require Bloom to 
report on a regular basis to his supervising 
probation officer contrary to agreement of 
probation, and failing to otherwise supervise 
his activities; (6) failing to initiate 
proceedings to revoke Bloom's probation despite 
the fact that Bloom had failed and/or refused to 
comply with the order of probation and the 
agreement of probation on numerous occasions 
prior to the collision; and (7) failing to act 
reasonably and prudently under the circumstances 
despite having knowledge that Bloom had been 
convicted at least on two prior occasions of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of intoxicating beverages and hence 
posed a great threat to the safety of the public 
unless adequately supervised. 
Each and all of those foregoing negligent acts 
and omissions of the Board were proximate causes 
of the collision and plaintiff Maude Sterling's 
damages. 
id. at 757 
The State argued that the acts complained of were 
discretionary functions and that the State owed plaintiff no 
duty. After rejecting the State's discretionary function 
analysis discussed supra, the Court analyzed duty owed. 
In beginning its duty analysis the Court noted that 
Idaho Code §6-903(9) provided: 
every governmental entity is subject to 
liability for money damages . . . whether 
arising out of a government or proprietary 
function, where the governmental entity if a 
private person or entity would be liable for 
money damages under the Laws of the State of 
Idaho. . . Clearly then, the language has always 
stated that if a private person or entity would 
be liable, so, then, will be the government. 
Id. at 767. 
The State then argued that plaintiff was 
foreseeably endangered by defendant. The Court responded 
stating: 
While the statute does not purport to identify 
by name or class those to whom that assigned 
duty is owed, in the instant circumstances, 
obvious to the utmost, the motorists foreseeably 
endangered by the negligent supervision of Bloom 
are within the class protected. See, e.g., Beck 
v. Kansas University Foundation, 580 F.Supp. 
527, 534 (D.Kansas 1984)(Kansas Adult authority 
owed duty to protect those present at a 
university medical center from foreseeable 
danger posed by released prisoner); see 
generally Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts 
§53 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter "Prosser11). 
While the question of a "duty" may 
oftentimes be a difficult question, Prosser §53, 
it generally is not so considered in the context 
of a person charged with and empowered to 
control the conduct of a third person. Dean 
Prosser explains: 
The general duty which arises in many 
relations to take reasonable precautions for the 
safety of others may include the obligation to 
exercise control over the conduct of third 
persons. . . . 
[Some] relationships are custodial 
by nature, requiring the defendant to control 
his charge and to guard other persons against 
his dangerous propensities. Thus the owner of 
an automobile is in such a position to control 
the conduct of one who is driving it in his 
presence that he is required to act reasonably 
to prevent negligent driving. A tavern keeper 
must act reasonably to prevent intoxicated 
patrons from injuring others. An employer must 
prevent his employees from throwing objects from 
his factory windows, and this had been extended 
-9-
quite generally to include an obligation on the 
part of any occupier of premises to exercise 
reasonable care to control the conduct of any 
one upon them, for the protection of those 
outside. A franchiser may be liable for 
negligently permitting its franchisee to cheat 
the customers. The physician in charge of an 
operation may be liable for failure to prevent 
the negligence of his assistants. A hospital 
may be liable for permitting an unqualified 
doctor to treat a patient on its premises. The 
same rule has ben applied to hospitals and 
psychotherapists who have charge of dangerous 
mental patients, and to those who have charge of 
dangerous criminals. A common application of 
the principle is found in the liability of 
parents for failure to exercise proper control 
over their children, which is considered in the 
chapter on domestic relations. Yet, in the 
absence of the requisite relationship, there 
generally is no duty to protect others against 
harm from third persons. Prosser, §56, 
pp.383-85 (emphasis added, foot notes omitted). 
The duty to control a dangerous charge 
"and to guard other persons against his 
dangerous propensities" which Dean Prosser 
describes is acknowledged in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts: 
§319. Duty of Those in Charge of Person 
Having Dangerous Propensities. One who takes 
charge of a third person whom he knows or should 
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others 
if not controlled is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to control the third person to 
prevent him from doing such harm. 
Ld. at 768-769. 
The Court adopted §319 of the Restatement (Second) 
Torts then specifically addressed the State's argument that 
owed no specific duty to plaintiff. 
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Clearly a duty can be owed to more than single 
individuals known to the tort-feasor, in a case 
like the instant one, the duty is owed to a 
class rather than a single individual, With a 
drunk driver on the highways, it is strictly a 
matter of chance who may become his victim. For 
certain, however, potential victims include 
those persons in the class of motorists on the 
same highway. The negligent conduct here 
involved and alleged obviously endangered more 
than the single victim, Maude Sterling, As Dean 
Prosser noted, "liability in tort is based upon 
the relations of persons with others; and those 
relations may arise generally, with large groups 
or classes of persons, or singly, with an 
individual.n Prosser, §1, p.5. Here, the 
admitted negligent supervision of Bloom by the 
probation officer foreseeably created a 
potential for harm to those motorists whom Bloom 
would encounter on the state's highways. The 
probation officer owed those motorists a duty. 
Id, at 769 (Emphasis added) 
Utah, like Idaho, also has a provision in its 
Governmental Immunity Act which provides that if immunity is 
waived, "liability of the (governmental) entity shall be 
determined as if the entity were a private person." 
§63-30-4(1) U.C.A. (1953 as amended). The same analysis used 
in Sterling applies to this case. 
The State therefore owed a duty to protect plaintiff 
and all motorists and pedestrians because it assumed that duty 
statutorily (§64-7-8, U.C.A,) and because the court imposed a 
duty on the State to restrain Petersen until the court ordered 
his release. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons plaintiff/appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the final order of the 
District Court granting Dale R. and Suzette Brown and the 
State of Utah summary judgment and remand this matter for 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of March, 1989. 
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